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Abstract
In this paper, we study the interaction between self insurance and public in-
surance. In particular, we provide evidence on the relationship between unem-
ployment insurance benefits and home production using the American Time Use
Survey (ATUS) and the state-level unemployment insurance data of the U.S. The
empirical results suggest that moving to a two times more generous state would
decrease time spent on home production about 20% for unemployed. Then we
pursue a quantitative assessment using a dynamic competitive equilibrium model
in which households do home production as well as market production. The model
is able to generate the empirical facts regarding unemployment benefits and home
production. The fact that unemployment insurance benefits crowd out home pro-
duction is interpreted as a substitution between the two insurance mechanisms
against loss of earnings during unemployment spells.
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates whether households substitute public insurance (unemployment
benefits) for self insurance (home production) against loss of earnings during unemploy-
ment spells. We do so in three steps. First, we present a static model to develop an
intuition regarding the substitutability between different channels of insurance. Second,
motivated by the results of the static model, we provide empirical evidence on the rela-
tionship between the level of unemployment insurance and home production using the
American Time Use Survey (ATUS) and the state-level unemployment insurance data.
Third, we pursue a quantitative assessment on the documented empirical facts using a
dynamic heterogenous-agents model of unemployment with incomplete asset markets.
Although there is a vast literature on the effects of unemployment insurance policies
on market production, surprisingly there is lack of theory and evidence on the effects
of unemployment benefits on non-market production (in particular, home production).1
Recent studies provided evidence on the use of home production as a self insurance
mechanism against lost/reduced earnings.2 Since unemployment benefit programs pro-
vide another channel of insurance against lost earnings, we would like to investigate
whether people tend to substitute these two insurance mechanisms.
In doing so, we initially formulate the problem of unemployed agents in terms of
income and time allocations in a single period. They are assumed to enjoy consuming
goods and leisure. They are able to produce home consumption goods (home production)
by combining time and market inputs. Their composite consumption is a combination
of home produced consumption goods and market produced consumption goods. They
receive unemployment benefits, which they allocate to either market produced consump-
1See Krueger and Meyer 2002 for a detailed survey on the labor supply effects of social benefit
programs.
2Aguiar and Hurst 2005 document that households increase home production at retirement. Burda
and Hammermesh 2010 and Taskin 2011 document that households increase home production during
unemployment spells
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tion goods or market inputs of home production. They allocate their time to either
leisure or home production. Optimality implies that agents tend to spend less time for
home production as they receive higher amounts of unemployment benefits, i.e. they
substitute self insurance with public insurance.
We then use the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) and American state-level un-
employment insurance data to provide empirical evidence on the relationship between
home production and the level of unemployment insurance. The empirical results sug-
gest a negative relationship between the later and the former. In particular, moving
to a two times more generous state would - on average - decrease time spent on home
production about 20% for unemployed. Moreover, we investigate a stronger relationship
between these two insurance channels (unemployment benefits and home production) for
those who have less additional insurance opportunities; in particular, single households
respond more strongly compared to the entire sample and household that are married
with a non-employed spouse respond more strongly compared to those married with an
employed spouse.
In order to pursue a quantitative assessment on the substitution between home pro-
duction and unemployment insurance benefits, we present a dynamic model featuring
a heterogeneous agent framework, where households receive idiosyncratic employment
shocks. The asset markets are incomplete in which households can partially insure
themselves through a non-interest bearing asset. An additional channel of partial in-
surance is home production, that is households can increase their home production to
insure against lost earnings during unemployment spells. The model implies a reduction
in average hours of home production in response to the increased levels of unemploy-
ment insurance. In particular, the average fraction of time spent on home production
for unemployed is decreasing from .17 to .13 as we increase replacement rate from .20
to .90 gradually. This result is consistent with the empirical results and in line with the
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interpretation of substitutability between self-insurance (home production) and public
insurance (unemployment benefits) against loss of earnings during unemployment spells.
Substitutability between insurance channels has been studied in several papers. For
instance, Engen and Gruber (2001) consider precautionary savings as a self insurance
mechanism and examine the relationship between unemployment insurance and pre-
cautionary savings. They find that households increase their precautionary savings in
response to a decrease in unemployment insurance benefits. They interpret this as a
substitution between self insurance and public insurance. Cullen and Gruber (2000)
consider spousal labor supply as a self insurance mechanism against loss of earnings
during unemployment spells. They find that unemployment insurance crowds out this
kind of family-insurance mechanism. Cutler and Gruber (1996a,1996b) provide empirical
evidence on the fact that households substitute public health insurance for the private
one using the policy changes in the U.S. in 1980’s and 1990’s. Chetty and Saez (2010)
emphasize the role of informal self insurance mechanisms such as loans from relatives and
spousal labor supply - which does not generate moral hazard problem - in determining
the optimal level of social insurance. Among others, Golosov and Tsyvinsky (2007), At-
tanasio and Rios-Rull (2000), Ortigueira and Siassi (2011), and Taskin (2011) study the
interaction between self insurance and public insurance and determine the optimal level
of the later under availability of various sources of self insurance. A number of papers
including Moffit (1985), Meyer (1990), Card and Levine (2000), and Nakajima (2011)
study the effect of unemployment insurance policies on labor supply using the U.S. data.
We contribute to the literature on the interaction between self and public insurance by
studying home production and unemployment benefits in a dynamic competitive equi-
librium framework, and providing empirical evidence on the interaction between these
two insurance mechanisms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we present a simple
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theoretical model to illustrate an intuition about the substitutability between different
types of insurance channels. We provide empirical evidence in section 3. In section 4,
we present the full dynamic model and discuss the quantitative results, and we finally
conclude in section 5.
2 A Static Model
In this section, we propose a simple theoretical model to provide an intuitive explanation
for the relationship between unemployment insurance policies and home production. We
consider a static model - a modified version of Greenwood et al. (1991) - where individuals
maximize their single-period utility by enjoying consumption and leisure. We assume
that individuals can consume two type of goods; namely home goods and market goods.
They can spend their income for purchasing market goods or inputs to produce home
goods. They can spend their time on leisure or producing goods at home. Therefore, the
home good is produced by a combination of individuals’ time and market expenditures.
We formulate the problem of the individual as follows:
max
h,x
u(c, l)
s.t.
cm + x = b
ch = f(h, x)
c = g(cm, ch)
h+ l = 1
where, cm is market good, ch is home good, x is amount of income spent on home produc-
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tion inputs, l is leisure, h is time spent for home production, and b is the unemployment
benefits. For simplicity, we assume that the only income for the unemployed individuals
is unemployment benefits, b.
Let utility, composite good, and home production function be defined as:
u(c, l) = φl log(c) + (1− φ) log(l) (1)
g(cm, ch) = (αc
( s−1
s
)
m + (1− α)c
( s−1
s
)
h )
(1/( s−1
s
)) (2)
f(h, x) = hνx(1−ν) (3)
where, e ≤ 1, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, 0 ≤ ν ≤ 1, 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1.
The individual makes time allocation and expenditure allocation decisions to maxi-
mize his/her single-period utility. We obtain the optimality conditions with respect to h
and x are as follows:
φν(1− α)x(1−v)(
s−1
s
)hv(
s−1
s
)−1
α(b− x)(
s−1
s
) + (1− α)(hνx1−ν)(
s−1
s
)
=
1− φ
1− h
(4)
(1− ν)(1 − α)hv(
s−1
s
)x(1−ν)(
s−1
s
)−1 = α(b− x)((
s−1
s
)−1) (5)
In above equations, parameter s represents household’s willingness to substitute home
goods and market goods. Greater s implies a greater substitutability between home and
market goods.
We follow optimality conditions 4 and 5 in order to understand the response of h
and x with respect to the changes in b. Note that the optimal h and x depend on the
substitutability between market goods and home goods (s).
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Optimality condition 4 equates the marginal benefit (MB from now on) of h, which
is expressed on the left hand side (LHS from now on), to the marginal cost (MC from
now on) of h, which is presented on the right hand side (RHS, from now on). MB of
an increment in h is reflected as an increase in home goods due to the increase in h
multiplied by the utility from each additional unit of home goods. MC of an increment
in h is reflected as the foregone utility from decreased leisure due to the increased h.
The effect of a change in b on the optimal level of h depends on two effects: one is a
direct effect of a change in b, and the other is an indirect effect through x. They affect
the optimal level of h in opposite directions and the dominant one is determined by the
value of substitutability between home goods and market goods, s.
The direct effect of an increase in b on the optimal value of h is derived as follows:
according to equation (4), the MB of h is negatively related to the level of b. Therefore,
keeping everything else constant, an increase in b implies a downward movement in the
optimal level of h. Moreover, the size of the direct effect of increased b on the optimal
value of h is bigger for the greater values of s.
The intuition behind the direct effect is the following: when b is increased, the com-
posite consumption is increased and MB from additional consumption units decrease,
therefore MB from additional units of home goods decrease as well.3 Since the MB of
h is determined by the utility from increased home goods, the MB of h decreases. As a
result, households tend to prefer less h and enjoy more leisure upon an increase in b.
The indirect effect of an increase in b on the optimal value of h is derived as
follows: the MB of h is positively related to the level of x. Therefore, the change in
the optimal level of x in response to an increase in b affects the optimal value of h as
well. Equation (5) determines the optimal level of x, where MB (LHS) is represented
by the utility derived from increase in home goods due to the increase in x, and MC
3Because this is a static model, an increase in income trivially causes to an increase in consumption.
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Figure 1: Static Model: Comparative Statics
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Notes: The figure illustrates the responses of optimal decisions (h, x, ch, cm) to
changes in the level of unemployment insurance. Greater values of s indicate
stronger substitutability between home goods and market goods. The values
of the rest of the parameters are fixed to the numbers used in Greenwood et
al. 1991.
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(RHS) is represented by the foregone utility from the decreased market goods (cm) due
to the increase in x. According to equation (5), MC of x is negatively related and MB is
invariant to the level of b. Therefore, an increase in b has a positive effect on the optimal
value of x. Recall that increased x has a positive effect on the MB of h, which leads to
an increase in h. Moreover, the size of this effect is smaller for the greater values of s
(RHS of equation 5).
To sum up the two opposing effect: the direct (indirect) effect of an increase in
b on the optimal value of h is negative (positive) and increasing (decreasing) with s.
Therefore, a threshold level s¯ equates these two effects. If s is greater (smaller) than s¯,
the optimal value of h decreases (increases), otherwise optimal value of h is invariant to
an increase in b.
Figure 1 summarizes the above discussion. The figure depicts the optimal allocations
of the household for various values of b and s. 4 Panels (a) and (b) depict the optimal
levels of h and x. As shown in panel (a), optimal h is decreasing with b when the degree
of substitutability between home goods and market goods (s) is greater than a threshold
value, 1. If s is equal to 1, optimal h does not respond to the changes in b. If s is smaller
than the threshold value, then optimal h is increasing with b. These are illustrated in
panel (a) of Figure 1 and clarify the net effect on the optimal value of h.
Panel (b) shows the effect of an increase in b on the optimal value of x. This is
critical because a change in x affects the MB of h, therefore b affects the optimal value
of h through x. The optimal value of x is increasing with the value of b and the rate of
increase is smaller when s is greater. Therefore the indirect effect of b - through x - on
h is positive in general, and weaker when s is greater.
Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 1 show the implied allocation of home goods (ch) and
market goods (cm). When the two goods are weakly substitutable, the response of the
4The rest of the parameters are fixed to the values reported in Greenwood et al. 1991.
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optimal levels of the two goods are similar to an increase in b. When they are strongly
substitutable, cm absorbs most of the increase in b following the movements in optimal
values of h and x (panels (a) and (b)).
Following the empirically plausible values of the elasticity of substitution (1.5 to 2.5)
between home and market goods (s), we can conclude that the model implies a negative
relationship between the level of unemployment benefits (b) and the time devoted for
home production (h).5
3 Empirical Evidence
Motivated by the results of the theoretical model in the previous section, we provide
empirical evidence on the relationship between the level of unemployment insurance and
home production in this section.
3.1 Data
We use the 2003-2008 periods of American Time Use Survey (ATUS) and state-level
unemployment insurance data for the corresponding period to carry out the empirical
exercise. ATUS is a supplement to Current Population Survey (CPS) and conducted
by the U.S. Census Bureau. Respondents report their daily time allocation on various
(about 400) activities.
The activities that are used for production of goods and services at home instead of
purchasing from market are considered as home production. We aggregate the fraction of
time devoted to the corresponding activities to measure time spent on home production.
The activities are reported in minutes at daily scale. We rescale them by multiplying with
5See McGrattan et al (1997), Chang and Schorfheide (2003) and Aguiar and Hurst (2007) for the
values of the aforementioned elasticity.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Group # of Obs. % Freq. Mean HP
Full Sample 65,978 100.00 14.14
Employed 50,444 76.46 12.68
Unemployed 2,580 3.91 18.82
Long Spell 2,178 84.42 18.85
Short Spell 402 15.58 18.63
Single 1,447 56.09 16.15
Married 1,133 43.91 22.21
Female 1,521 58.95 20.62
Male 1,059 41.05 16.23
Not in Labor Force 12,954 19.63 18.89
Notes: The sample includes individuals at ages between 20-65. Data source: Bureau of
Labor Statistics (ATUS).
7/60 to get weekly hours. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for home production
in the ATUS.
In ATUS, individuals report their labor force status in five categories: working, ab-
sent, unemployed and looking for jobs, temporarily laid off, not in labor force. The
first two groups are considered employed, the second two groups are considered unem-
ployed, and the last group is considered inactive agents. Table 1 reports the number of
observations in each group.
We use the differences in unemployment insurance policies across states to analyze
the effect of the amount of unemployment insurance on the time spent for home produc-
tion. In general, the states target to make a payment equal to 50% of lost earnings as
the unemployment benefits. However, the state policies display variation with respect to
their maximum insurance payments, and we exploit this variation to execute our empir-
ical analysis. The unemployment insurance data and the ATUS are obtained from the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Table 5 shows the state dependent maximum weekly
unemployment insurance payments and the dispersion across states.
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3.2 Unemployment Insurance Policies and Home Production
We estimate two alternative equations to test a possible relationship between unemploy-
ment insurance policies and home production.
Alternative 1: In this method, we restrict the sample to the unemployed households
and estimate the following equation:
log (HPist) = α + βXi + γ log (wmbist) + ǫist (6)
where, HPist is the weekly hours spent on home production of individual i in state s
at time t. Xi is a set of explanatory variables including age and its square, educational
attaintment and its square, family size, race dummies, gender dummy, marital status
dummy, and year dummies. Weekly maximum unemployment benefit that individual i
can have in state s at time t is denoted with wmbist.
We pool the repeated ATUS cross sections of 2003 to 2008 and estimate equation
(6) twice; once with the entire sample of unemployed, and once with those who are
unemployed for less than or equal to 26 weeks. The purpose of this specification is to
predict the individuals who are eligible for unemployment insurance. Since the maximum
duration of unemployment benefits is 26 weeks (exceptions Massachusetts: 30 weeks,
Montana: 28 weeks, and Washington: 30 weeks), we use 26 weeks as a threshold value
for categorization of the sub-samples.6
We are interested in the estimated coefficient of γ in equation (6). Panel (a) of
Table 2 presents the estimated coefficient of γ for short-term unemployed agents.7 The
corresponding value is -0.22 and statistically significant for this sample (first column).
6Here, we would like to point out that these durations reflect the long-run averages. The duration of
payments usually increase in recessions and decrease to the long-run values upon economic recoveries.
7Recall that we estimate equation (6) for this sub-group of unemployed in order to proxy those who
are eligible for unemployment benefits.
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Table 2: Home Production and Unemployment Benefits in ATUS: Only Unemployed
Panel (a): Short Term Unemployed
(unemployment duration≤26 weeks)
Married w/ Married w/
All Single Employed Non-employed
γˆ -0.220∗ -0.452∗∗ 0.037 -0.359
(0.111) (0.222) (0.145) (0.330)
Observations 1937 905 808 224
R2 0.103 0.109 0.071 0.116
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05
Panel (b): All Unemployed
Married w/ Married w/
All Single Employed Non-employed
γˆ -0.192∗ -0.415∗ 0.028 -0.236
(0.113) (0.229) (0.127) (0.320)
Observations 2191 1051 895 245
R2 0.101 0.106 0.058 0.102
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05
The interpretation is that moving to a two times more generous state would - on average -
decrease the time devoted for home production about 22% for an unemployed household.
We also divide the short-term unemployed agents to three sub-groups: single, married
with an employed spouse, and married with a non-employed spouse. The second, third
and the fourth columns of Table 2 present the estimated coefficient of γ for those sub-
groups. The purpose of this exercise is to understand the role of household composition
on the results. The estimated coefficient for single agents is -0.452 and statistically
significant. For those who are married with an employed spouse and those who are
married with a non-employed spouse, the estimated coefficients are 0.037 and -0.359,
respectively.
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Panel (b) of Table 2 reports the results for the entire sample of unemployed (instead of
only short-term unemployed). The estimated coefficients are slightly smaller than those
for the short-term unemployed. This is a very intuitive result, because one would expect a
greater coefficient for those who are more likely to be eligible for unemployment benefits.
Also, the estimated coefficients for the aforementioned sub-groups (single, married w/
an employed, married w/ a non-employed) are ordered similarly with those estimated
using short-term unemployed.
Alternative 2: In this alternative, we include the entire set of workers to the sam-
ple instead of restricting to the unemployed. In particular, we estimate the following
equation:
logHPist = α + βXi + θUi + γ log (wmbst)× Ui + ψXs + ǫist (7)
where, Xi represents a set of demographic variables, Ui is an unemployment dummy
variable, log (wmbst)×Ui is the interaction between benefits and unemployment, and Xs
is a set of dummy variables for each state. We are interested in the estimated coefficient
of γ in equation (7).
We estimate the equation twice; once where Ui represents only short-term unemployed
(26 weeks or less), and once where it represents the entire set of unemployed. Panels (a)
and (b) of Table 3 present the corresponding results. The estimated coefficients are very
close to the ones estimated using equation (6), in which only unemployed were included
in estimation. Also, the order of the coefficients estimated for the aforementioned sub-
groups (all, single, married w/ an employed spouse, married w/ a non-employed) are
similar to the order of those estimated using only unemployed.
Interpretation: We would like to elaborate on interpretation of three interesting
empirical results which are robust to both of the alternative estimated equations: i-)
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Table 3: Home Production and Unemployment Benefits in ATUS: All workers
Panel (a): Ui: short term unemployed
Married w/ Married w/
All Single Employed Non-employed
γˆ -0.188 -0.368∗ 0.015 -0.198
(0.137) (0.222) (0.184) (0.310)
Observations 52838 18920 26924 6994
R2 0.076 0.059 0.071 0.097
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05
Panel (b): Ui: all unemployed
Married w/ Married w/
All Single Employed Non-employed
γˆ -0.153 -0.329 0.029 -0.136
(0.130) (0.216) (0.168) (0.302)
Observations 52838 18920 26924 6994
R2 0.077 0.060 0.072 0.098
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05
the estimated coefficients of γ for single agents are greater than those for the entire
sample, ii-) the estimated coefficients of γ for the sub-sample of agents who are married
with a non-employed spouse are greater than those for the sub-sample of agents who are
married with an employed spouse, iii-) for any given sub-group, the relationship between
unemployment benefits and home production is stronger for the short-term unemployed
compared to all unemployed.
These three results can be explained intuitively within the context of substitutabil-
ity between different kind of insurance options. First, a single unemployed individual
can maintain his/her consumption through either increasing his/her home production
or spending unemployment benefits. Therefore the substitutability between these two
channels is supposed to be stronger compared to an individual with more insurance op-
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tions such as spousal income or spousal home production. Since the substitutability
is high between home production and unemployment insurance for a single household,
home production decreases strongly when unemployment insurance increases. That is,
γˆ is greater for single households compared to all households. Second, a household with
an employed spouse can use the income of the spouse as a self insurance against loss of
earnings during unemployment spells. Therefore, one would expect a lower substitutabil-
ity between unemployment benefits and home production which would imply a smaller
γˆ for those households. Third, one would expect a stronger relationship between the
level of unemployment benefits and home production for those who are more likely to be
eligible for unemployment benefits. Therefore, the estimated coefficient of γ is greater
for the short-term unemployed households. The estimated coefficients in Tables 2 and 3
are consistent with this interpretation.
4 Full Model
In this section, we study a realistic dynamic model to quantitatively asses the relationship
between unemployment insurance benefits and home production. We do so by extending
the model of Hansen and I˙mrohorog˘lu (1992) with a home production technology. In
general, the model features a heterogeneous agents framework with incomplete asset
markets. The details are explained in the following subsections.
4.1 Household Preferences and Constraints
The population consists of a continuum of ex-ante identical agents. There is ex-post het-
erogeneity in the society due to the fact that the agents receive idiosyncratic employment-
unemployment shocks. The idiosyncratic shocks follow a two-state Markov process. In
particular, the transition probabilities are defined as χ(i, j) = P (e′ = j|e = i), where
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i, j ∈ {0, 1}, where e represents the employment status which equals 1 if the individual
is employed, and 0 otherwise.
The agents enjoy utility from consumption good and leisure, and maximize their
life-time expected utility:
E
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, lt)
where u(·) is a utility function, β is a time discount factor, ct is consumption, and lt
is leisure.
The utility function is a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) function composed
of consumption and leisure with a risk aversion parameter of σ, and the composition of
consumption and leisure is formed as a Cobb-Douglas function with a share parameter
of ρ:
u(c, l) =
c1−σ − 1
1− σ
+ α
l1−σ
1− σ
Agents have a time constraint which depends on the employment status:
ht + lt + n(e) = 1 (8)
where ht is time spent on home production, lt is leisure and n(e) is labor supply. If
an agent is unemployed, then n(e) = 0, if he or she is employed, then n(e) = n¯, i.e. the
labor supply is inelastic and provided in the extensive margin.
The asset markets are incomplete where agents can partially insure themselves
through a storage technology (non-interest bearing asset) which evolves as follows:
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xt + at+1 = at + y
d
t (e) (9)
0 ≤ at (10)
where xt represents market expenditures, and at+1 is the amount of wealth carried
to the next period. Disposable income (ydt ) depends on employment status and receipt
of unemployment benefits which is explained later on. Equation (10) is a borrowing
constraint.
4.2 Home Production
Agents produce consumption goods through home production which combines time and
market expenditures:
ct = f(ht, xt) (11)
where f(·) is a home production function, ct is the amount of consumption goods
and services, ht is time spent on home production and xt is market expenditures. In
particular, the home production function is a Constant Elasticity of substitution (CES)
form as follows:
f(h, x) = (ψhν + xν)1/ν (12)
where, ψ is a home production technology parameter and ν is a parameter which pins
down a value for substitutability between time (h) and expenditure (x) inputs of home
production, where the elasticity parameter is equal to 1
1−ν
.
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4.3 Unemployment Insurance, Taxation and Disposable In-
come
An unemployed agent is qualified for unemployment benefits if he/she does not receive a
job offer. If he/she is employed or quits a job by his/her own decision or rejects a job offer,
then he/she is not qualified for unemployment benefits. Therefore, only involuntarily
unemployed agents receive unemployment benefits. The benefits are provided as a certain
faction θ of lost earnings, which is called ”replacement rate”.
The unemployment benefits are financed through proportional earning taxes, denoted
with τ . The unemployment benefit system, proportional taxes and the employment
process lead to the following disposable income schedule for the agents:
gets no offer (e = 0) ⇒ ydt = b (13)
gets an offer (e = 1), accepts ⇒ ydt = (1− τ)y (14)
gets an offer (e = 1), rejects ⇒ ydt = 0 (15)
where, e represents employment opportunity, ydt represents disposable income, y rep-
resents wage, and τ represents proportional tax. There is only one type of wage (y) and
it is normalized to 1.
The disposable income of an agent equals: (i) unemployment benefits, b, which is
payed as a fraction of lost wages θy, if he/she has no job offer; after tax wages, (1− τ)y,
if he/she receives and accepts a job offer; 0, if he/she receives but rejects a job offer.
Recall that the agent can also enjoy his/her accumulated wealth in all these three cases.
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4.4 Recursive Formulations
In this section, we formulate the problem of agents in recursive form to solve for the
equilibrium numerically. An agent with state (a, e) has the following value function
formulation:
V (a, e) =


maxa′,h{u[f(h, a + (1− τ)θy − a
′), 1 − h] + β
∑
e′ χ(0, e
′)V (a′, e′)}, if e=0
max{maxa′,h{u[f(h, a+ (1− τ)y − a
′), 1− n¯− h] + β
∑
e′ χ(1, e
′)V (a′, e′)},
maxa′,h{u[f(h, a− a
′), 1 − h] + β
∑
e′ χ(1, e
′)V (a′, e′)}}, if e=1
s.t. 0 ≤ a′
(16)
Equation (16) represents the recursive problem of agents where we substituted the
time constraint (equation 8), the budget constraint (equation 9), and the home produc-
tion function (equation 11). In above equation, u(·) is a utility function, a is wealth level,
h is time devoted for home production, f(·) is the home production function, τ is a pro-
portional tax on wages, θ is replacement rate, β is discount factor, and e is employment
status.
The first line of equation (16) represents the value function of the agent when he/she
has no job offer. The second and third lines together represent the value function of
the agent when he/she receives a job offer. The agent decides to accept or reject a job
offer depending on the corresponding values of those decisions which are presented in
the second and the third lines, respectively.
4.5 Equilibrium
We define a stationary competitive equilibrium as a set of decision rules of expenditure
x(ω), stock of wealth a′(ω), home production h(ω), leisure l(ω), offer acceptance η(ω),
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where ω = (a, e), a tax rate τ , an invariant measure λ(ω) such that;
• the decision rules solve the agent’s problem defined in equation (16),
• the goods market clears:
∑
ω
λ(ω)x(ω) =
∑
ω
λ(ω)η(ω)y (17)
• the government budget is balanced:
∑
a
λ(a, 0)(1− τ)θy =
∑
a
λ(a, 1)η(a, 1)yτ (18)
• and the time-invariant distribution solves:
λ(ω′) =
∑
e
∑
a∈Ω
χ(e, e′)λ(ω) (19)
where Ω = {a : a′ = a′(a, e)}.
Among the equilibrium conditions, equation (17) ensures that the market goods pro-
duced by employed agents (RHS) equals the total expenditure of market goods (LHS).
Equation (18) equates the taxes collected from employed agents (RHS) to the unemploy-
ment benefits payed to the unemployed agents (LHS). Equation (19) ensures that the
distribution of the population does not vary over time.
4.6 Calibration
The model parameters are calibrated using the U.S. data. We calibrate the values of the
parameters such that the chosen model generated moments are consistent with those of
the U.S. data.
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Table 4: Parameters of the Benchmark Economy
Parameter Value
β Time discount factor 0.995
σ Risk aversion 2.00
α Utility, leisure 0.50
n Constant labor supply 0.45
θ Benchmark replacement rate 0.40
χ(0, 0) Employment opportunities transition 0.50
χ(1, 1) Employment opportunities transition 0.9681
ψ Weight of time input in home production (HP) 0.31
ρ Elasticity of substitution b/w time and market goods 1.45
A model period chosen to be six weeks. The time discount factor (β) is set to 0.995
which is conventional in monthly to quarterly models. Risk aversion parameter (σ) is
set to 2, which is standard in the literature. We repeated the quantitative exercises with
different values of σ as well. The value of the utility parameter of leisure, which is denoted
with α is chosen to match average time spent for home production by unemployed. When
we set α equal to .50, average time spent for home production by unemployed is equal to
17.98 hours/week in the benchmark model. The empirical counterpart of this statistics
is equal to 18.82 hours/week in the data.8
The value of constant labor supply is set to 45% of total available time, which
matches average hours of work in the U.S. data. The transition matrix of employment-
unemployment states is as follows:


.9681 .0319
.5 .5

 (20)
The above transition matrix matches the long-run rate and average duration of unem-
8We use American Time Use Survey to calculate average time spent on home production by unem-
ployed.
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Figure 2: Dynamic Model: Replacement Rate vs Home Production
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Notes: The figure draws the response of optimal time spent for home produc-
tion to the changes in replacement rates. Greater values of σ indicate higher
degrees of risk aversion.
ployment in the U.S., which are equal to 6% and 12 weeks, respectively. The benchmark
replacement rate (θ) is set to be 40% using the estimated values in the empirical litera-
ture.9
The values of technology (ψ) and elasticity of substitution (ρ) parameters are set
to .31 and 1.45, respectively. These values are borrowed from Aguiar and Hurst (2007)
where they estimate a home production function using American Time Use Survey. The
benchmark values of the parameters are reported in Table 4.
4.7 Quantitative Results
In this section, we present the quantitative results from the dynamic model where we
analyze the relationship between unemployment insurance and home production.
9Gruber (1997) estimates an average replacement rate of about 40%. Clark and Summers (1982)
estimate an average replacement rate of around 65%. In the U.S., replacement rates have decreased over
time, and Gruber’s work is more recent, therefore we pick the benchmark replacement rate as 40%.
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Figure 3: Dynamic Model Cont’d: Replacement Rate vs Home Production
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Notes: Greater values of ρ indicate stronger substitutability between time and
goods in home production function.
In order to understand the relationship between unemployment benefits and home
production, we solve the stationary competitive equilibrium of the model at several
replacement rates between 20% and 90%. We compute the average time spent on home
production and compare across those stationary equilibria.
In the benchmark model, the average fraction of time spent on home production is
decreasing from .17 to .13 as we increase replacement rate from .20 to .90 gradually.
These fractions correspond to 18.70 hours/week and 14.75 hours/week. The fact that
time spent on home production is decreasing with replacement rate is robust to various
degrees of relative risk aversion (σ), which is depicted in Figure 2. This result is consistent
with the empirical evidence provided in 3.
Figure 3 depicts the average time spent on home production against the replacement
rate at various values of parameter ρ which denotes the elasticity of substitution between
time and market goods in home production. The response of time spent on home pro-
duction gets weaker as the value of parameter ρ takes values smaller than a threshold .
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Figure 4: Dynamic Model Cont’d: Replacement Rate vs Mean Assets
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Notes: The figure draws the response of optimal savings to the changes in
replacement rates. Greater values of σ indicate higher degrees of risk aversion.
This happens because the direct and indirect effects of unemployment benefits on home
production neutralizes each other at this threshold level which was explained in detail
using a static model in Section 2.
We report the relationship between the rate of unemployment insurance and mean
asset holdings by households in Figure 4. The level of asset holdings is decreasing with
the rate of unemployment insurance. In particular mean assets decrease from 2.5 to 0.5
as we increase the replacement rate from 20% to 90% gradually. This result is in line
with the empirical findings of Engen and Gruber (2001), where they provide evidence
on the fact that households substitute self insurance (savings) with public insurance
(unemployment benefits). In particular, they report a negative relationship between
households’ stock of wealth and received unemployment benefits.
In general, the quantitative results can be interpreted within a context of substi-
tutability between self insurance and public insurance. Both savings and home produc-
tion channels of self insurance are used less intensively in response to an increase in
public insurance (unemployment benefits) as shown in Figures 2 and 4.
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5 Conclusion
Previous literature provided both theoretical insights and empirical evidence on the
effects of unemployment insurance policies on market production. However, the effects
of unemployment benefits on non-market production (in particular, home production)
have not been studied well. This paper fills this gap by studying the relationship between
home production and unemployment insurance policies. Both in the model and the data,
we find that higher unemployment benefits are associated with lower home production.
This distortion - as well as distortion on market production - should be considered in
optimal unemployment insurance policy design.
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Table 5: Weekly Maximum Benefits and Weekly Hours of Home Production
state 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Mean wmb Mean HP
AL 210 210 220 220 230 235 219.13 13.23
AK 320 320 320 320 320 320 320.00 16.62
AZ 205 205 240 240 240 240 226.02 14.16
AR 333 345 345 382 395 409 363.92 13.43
CA 370 370 450 450 450 450 417.84 14.43
CO 390 398 407 421 435 455 415.18 14.83
CT 481 504 522 540 558 576 523.10 14.63
DE 330 330 330 330 330 330 330.00 13.27
DC 309 209 359 359 359 359 327.75 9.90
FL 275 275 275 275 275 275 275.00 13.44
GA 295 300 300 310 320 320 307.66 12.63
HI 371 417 436 459 475 523 438.60 15.09
ID 315 320 325 322 338 364 329.01 14.88
IL 431 438 456 475 498 511 463.68 13.87
IN 312 348 369 390 390 390 362.34 14.74
IA 347 368 381 398 410 426 382.74 14.22
KS 333 351 359 373 386 407 365.04 13.93
KY 329 365 365 365 401 415 367.90 13.38
LA 258 258 258 258 258 258 258.00 14.30
ME 408 438 453 469 480 496 446.32 15.63
MD 310 310 310 340 340 380 331.17 12.82
MA 768 762 778 778 862 900 798.03 14.30
MI 362 362 362 362 362 362 362.00 14.75
MN 427 478 493 515 521 538 487.21 14.20
MS 200 210 210 210 210 210 207.69 12.67
MO 250 250 250 270 280 320 269.62 13.97
MT 286 323 335 346 362 386 333.35 15.58
NE 262 380 288 288 288 298 300.64 15.60
NV 301 317 329 346 362 262 315.97 14.15
NH 372 372 372 372 372 427 380.33 16.77
NJ 475 490 503 521 536 560 508.52 14.10
NM 286 290 350 372 386 455 347.25 17.14
NY 405 405 405 405 405 405 405.00 14.11
NC 396 416 426 442 457 476 430.10 13.52
ND 290 312 324 340 351 385 326.44 11.32
OH 414 436 446 462 479 493 449.61 14.49
OK 304 275 292 317 342 392 319.62 13.83
OR 400 410 419 434 445 463 424.42 15.31
PA 438 469 486 505 528 547 487.81 14.48
RI 518 551 577 596 615 641 569.55 17.86
SC 278 285 292 303 303 326 296.80 12.88
SD 234 248 256 266 274 285 256.05 14.72
TN 275 275 275 275 275 275 275.00 13.58
TX 319 330 336 336 364 378 342.37 13.60
UT 312 377 371 383 406 427 375.13 14.04
VT 351 359 371 385 394 409 373.98 15.60
VA 318 316 326 330 347 363 333.13 13.32
WA 496 496 496 496 496 515 499.21 15.39
WV 351 358 366 380 391 408 373.22 15.50
WI 324 329 329 341 355 355 337.66 15.18
WY 283 306 316 330 349 387 322.40 14.13
Std. Dev.
wmb 94.22 96.99 100.51 98.82 107.44 110.12 100.93 1.35
Std. Dev.
Log(wmb) 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.10
Notes: HP and wmb stand for ”home production” and ”weekly maximum benefit” respectively. Data source: U.S.
Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration. (http://ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/statelaws.asp)
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